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ABSTRACT 
This article presents a methodology designed to facilitate the systematic comparison of alternative discounting 
procedures for the costs and benefits of industrial regulatory activity. A discounting framework developed by 
Bradford is adapted for use in the context of industry regulation. Within this framework, the choice among the 
various discounting procedures is reduced to a choice between assumptions about various economic and 
financial parameter values. As an illustration of the way in which the framework can be applied, the article 
includes an examination of the validity of parameter assumptions implied by the discounting approach 
currently used by regulatory agencies in their analyses of regulations affecting the motor vehicle industry. 
Several hypothetical programs are analyzed to demonstrate the broad differences in program treatment that 
might be expected if this current discounting approach were replaced by procedures generated within the 
framework from more reasonable parameter assumptions. Sensitivity of the benefit/cost calculations to 
uncertainty about underlying parameters is also briefly discussed. 
Introduction 
The time path of regulatory costs and benefits is an important consideration in deter- 
mining the net worth of regulatory activity to society. Since the benefits and costs of 
compliance with a particular standard generally occur at different points in time, the 
weights attached to benefits and costs in each time period - that is, the discounting 
procedure - will often play a decisive role in determining whether a particular regulatory 
activity should be undertaken. 
Discounting facilitates comparison between cost and benefit streams that have differ- 
ent time profiles by collapsing future costs and benefits into present value equivalents - 
that is, valuing all costs and benefits at a single reference point in time, normally the 
present. The need for such an adjustment follows simply from the fundamental observa- 
tion that the perceived value today of having a (real) dollar today is in general greater 
than the perceived value today of having a (real) dollar at some fixed date in the future. 
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Though the need for adjusting the value of a dollar to reflect this time dimension is 
clear, the correct method of adjustment when public projects are involved is a complex 
issue. It continues to be a matter of controversy among economists, so much so that the 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has chosen to sidestep the theoretical 
debate and has suggested, in its guidelines for regulatory impact analyses ( 198 I), the use 
of a 10 percent real rate of discount for costs and benefits of all regulatory activity. In a 
partial acknowledgement of the underlying debate, the guidelines state that alternative 
discount rates, where justified, are to be used to perform sensitivity analysis. 
With regard to regulatory impact analyses for the motor vehicle industry, the 10 % rule 
and accompanying sensitivity analysis has been combined with a "cost-to-consumer" 
approach for estimating the costs of regulatory activity. The cost-to-consumer (c-t-c) 
approach is based on the premise that the direct resource costs of a regulation are best 
measured by its price impact on the products of the regulated industry. By measuring 
costs in this manner, the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation are discounted using 
the 10% rule. Sensitivity analysis, when it has been done, is accomplished by varying the 
discount rate around this 10 percent level. 
It is, however, impossible to proceed with a proper sensitivity analysis without some 
notion of the assumptions that underlie the 10% rule/c-t-c procedure and the uncertainty 
that is associated with those assumptions. Without such information, it is not clear that 
the 10% rule/c-t-c approach represents a "best guess" at the appropriate discounting 
procedure, nor is it clear what would constitute a reasonable range of parameter values 
for the purpose of sensitivity analysis. Thus, for example, in the absence of a clear and 
explicit definition of what the discount rate in the OMB procedure is supposed to 
represent, there is no basis upon which to judge the merits of requiring the use of a value 
of 40 percent as the "best estimate" - best estimate of what? - nor is there any meaningful 
way to choose a range of discount rates that ought reasonably to be considered in the 
sensitivity analysis. It is the aim of this article to provide a framework within which the 
assumptions underlying discounting procedures such as the 10% rule/c-t-c approach 
become explicit, and within which reasonable alternative procedures can be meaning- 
fully derived. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, the issues involved in selecting 
a discounting procedure for public investment projects are examined, and a short 
description of the major competing views expressed in the literature is provided. Next, a 
discounting framework developed by Bradford (1975) is described. It is particularly 
well-suited to serve as a vehicle for comparison of the competing views in the literature, 
since it reduces to each of the maj or discounting procedures under appropriate parame- 
ter assumptions. Finally, the Bradford framework is disaggregated and adapted to the 
costs and benefits of industry regulation. The resulting framework could in principle be 
applied to generate rea~sonable discounting procedures for the costs and benefits of any 
form of industrial regmatOry~ctivity. As an illustration, the framework is employed to 




In order to address the difference between the present value of a dollar held this period 
and a dollar held next period, a discounting procedure must contain information about 
the generally available rate of return on funds. Consequently, the notion of discounting is 
tied fundamentally to the measurement of opportunity costs - the value of the resources 
in their best alternative use. A proper discounting procedure will ensure that the return 
on the resources employed in any undertaking is at least as high as the return available in 
any feasible alternative use. 
It is well-accepted that the optimal rate of discount for private sector investment 
projects should reflect the returns available to the owners of the firm on alternative 
investments of equal risk [1]. Thus, for private sector investment projects, the real rate of 
discount is clearly the real (private) opportunity cost of capital to the firm, denoted r. It 
follows that the firm should undertake any investment project for which [2] 
r 1 
:~ C,] > 0 (l)  
t=0(1 +r)  ' [B '  
where: 
Bt ----- real benefits (returns on investment) accruing to the firm in period t, 
Ct = real costs of the investment project incurred by the firm in period t, 
T = duration of investment project, and 
r = opportunity cost of capital to the firm. 
Following this investment criterion, the firm will never allocate funds to a project whose 
return is less than what those funds could generate in some alternative feasible use. 
However, as pointed out by Baumol (1968), the optimal rate of discount for public 
sector investment projects is complicated by two apparently conflicting optimality 
criteria that involve both the opportunity cost of capital to the firm and the rate at which 
society is willing to trade present consumption for future consumption, or society's rate 
of time preference. 
On the one hand, if the government's objective is to achieve an efficient allocation of 
resources between the private and public sectors, it must not tax investment funds away 
from the private sector in order to undertake a public investment project whose real 
return is below that available from private sector investment. This suggests that the real 
rate of return available in the private sector, r, should be incorporated into the public 
project discounting procedure whenever funds for the public project in question would 
otherwise be invested by the private sector. 
On the other hand, if the government wishes to serve the time preferences of society 
and acknowledges the existence of a (real) rate, i, at which society is just willing to trade 
consumption now for consumption in the future, then a public project whose funding 
comes at the expense of foregone private consumption should be undertaken if and only 
36 
if its return is at or above the social rate of time preference. This suggests that the social 
rate of time preference, i, should be incorporated into the public project discounting 
procedure whenever funds for the public project in question would otherwise be con- 
sumed by society. 
In other words, where public projects are concerned, it appears that both the social 
rate of time preference, i, and the opportunity cost of capital, r, must be incorporated 
into the discounting framework [3]. Only by using such a framework can the govern- 
ment, on the one hand, hope to avoid taking funds away from the private sector in order 
to launch a public project whose return to society is less than what those funds would 
have generated in their alternative private sector use, and on the other, hope to avoid 
rejecting a public undertaking that would have actually improved society's well-being. 
The issue, then, is not whether to include both the opportunity cost of capital and the 
social rate of time preference in the public project discounting framework, but rather 
how best to include them. Two characteristics of the U.S. economy guarantee that this is 
not a trivial issue [4]. 
First, the government faces constraints on its investment opportunities that?revent it, 
in general, from taxing private consumption and simply investing those revenues freely 
in the private sector. If the government were able to do this freely, then all private 
investment opportunities would be public investment opportunities as well. In this case, 
only the rate of return on private capital would be relevant for the public investment 
decision, since it would represent the true opportunity cost of those funds. Ifa potential 
"public" project were to produce a lower rate of return than that prevailing in the private 
sector, then the "public" project would be rejected, and the government would instead 
invest those funds in a "private" sector undertaking. Since the government does not, in 
practice, have unlimited access to private sector undertakings, this simple answer is not 
justified [5]. 
Second, the issue itself would not arise in an undistorted economy with perfect capital 
markets, since only one relevant market rate of interest would exist, at once representing 
the opportunity cost of capital and the social rate of time preference. However, in reality, 
a host of taxes (and other distortions) on the income from capital and on the yields from 
savings forces the opportunity cost of capital above, and the social rate of time preference 
below, the undistorted market rate of interest. 
Moreover, the wedge between these two market rates is quantitatively substantial. 
While estimates of the real social rate of time preference lie in the 3 to 6 percent range, 
estimates of the real opportunity cost of capital range from 10 to 25 percent (Tresch 
1981). Thus, the contradiction to which Baumol refers raises a quantitatively important 
question: How should the discounting framework for public projects incorporate both 
the opportunity cost of capital in the private sector and the social rate of time preference? 
The Literature 
On this question, three well-defined groups have emerged in the literature. One group 
37 
[the opportunity cost approach - e.g., Harberger (1972), Baumol (1968), Sjaastad and 
Wisecarver (1977), Sandmo and Dreze (1971), and Mishan (1976)] sees the rate of 
discount on public investment as fundamentally an opportunity cost, reflecting the 
returns available in the best alternative use. Hence, it is the discount rate itself which 
should reflect information about i and r. Even without this group, there remains 
considerable disagreement over: 
9 which alternative investments are truly available to the government, 
9 the operational definition of returns, and 
9 empirical estimates, even when interpretations of the above points are agreed upon. 
However, despite such disagreements over just what the true opportunity costs of public 
investment funds are, economists in this group agree that it is the discount rate, and the 
discount rate alone, that must be adjusted to account for these opportunity costs. 
A second group [the time preference/shadow price approach - e.g., Marglin (1963a, 
1963b), Arrow (1966), and Feldstein (1972)] views the discount rate for public investment 
as simply the rate at which society is willing to trade consumption at present for 
consumption in the future, the social rate of time preference. Net benefits from a public 
project should be treated as additions to the stream of consumption available to society, 
and should be discounted in the manner that society would discount the value of any 
consumption stream. This group acknowledges the importance of the opportunity cost 
of funds, but argues that this opportunity cost is properly accounted for, not by adjusting 
the discount rate, but by applying an appropriate shadow price - a price which reflects 
the true social valuation - to investment costs of the project. 
A third group [e.g., Diamond (1968), Diamond and Mirrlees (1976), McKean (1958)] 
maintains that it is pointless to attempt to associate the rate of discount for public 
projects with either opportunity costs or social time preference. They view the rate of 
discount on public projects as simply one shadow price among many in the second-best 
(distorted) environment which will depend, as do all shadow prices, on the nature and 
extent of those distortions. 
While the view represented by Diamond and McKean may be the most satisfying on 
strictly theoretical grounds, it is not, by itself, particularly helpful in developing policy 
guidelines except that it suggests a criterion upon which to evaluate the existing opera- 
tional discounting procedures. Since the appropriate form for a discounting procedure 
ultimately depends on the environment within which it is to be applied, and since 
differences in the major discounting procedures can be traced to differences in under- 
lying assumptions, the validity of a discounting procedure for use in a particular 
situation may be judged by the validity in that situation of the assumptions underlying 
the procedure. In the next section, a framework is presented which facilitates the 
evaluation of alternative discounting procedures through the comparison of the assump- 
tions that underlie them. 
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Analysis 
The Bradford Framework 
In his 1975 article, Bradford presents a very general analytical f ramework which he uses 
to derive a discounting procedure for public investment programs. The framework is 
general enough to include the major competing discounting procedures (i.e., opportunity 
cost and time preference/shadow price approaches) as special cases, and is used here as a 
vehicle to facilitate comparison of the several alternatives9 
Bradford begins with an explicit statement of the government 's  constrained optimiza- 
tion problem. He first assumes that the government 's  objective in undertaking public 
investment projects is to maximize the discounted stream of aggregate consumption over 
time, where the discount rate is the social rate of  time preference. While governments 
may have distributional goals as well, these are achieved by redistributional actions 
which are assumed to be separate f rom government investment decisions [6]. 
Next, Bradford defines the shadow price of private capital, Vt, as the present value of 
the stream of consumption,  discounted at the social rate of  time preference, that is 
created by one dollar of private investment at time t. To clarify the meaning of  this 
important  concept, Bradford writes: 
9 imagine that a unit of time t capital drops like manna from heaven, affecting the whole stream of 
consumption starting at time t + 1. In this new consumption stream, by how much at most could one reduce 
the amount of cunsumption in period t, and still have a consumption stream as valuable (according to the 
government preferences) as the original, pre-manna, consumption stream? The answer is Vt, and in this 
sense, Vt is the social value of a unit of private capital at time t. 
Finally, Bradford assumes a second-best world in which government investment is 
restricted to certain classes of activity. The idea is that where private investment 
opportunities are not also public investment opportunities, the rate of return on these 
private projects does not represent the true opportunity cost to the goverment. Specif- 
ically, it is assumed that the government cannot redistribute funds from consumption to 
saving by simply taxing consumption and investing those funds freely in the private 
sector. Hence, to the extent that  funds for a potential public project do come f rom 
private consumption, the private rate of return, r, does not represent the opportunity cost 
for these funds and therefore should not enter into the public investment decision. 
Given V t and the explicit statement of  the government 's  constrained optimization 
problem, the public investment decision framework is derived simply by calculating the 
present discounted value of  the gains and the losses in consumption (discounted at the 
social rate of  time preference) that would result f rom the public project, and determining 
whether the former is larger than the latter. Specifically, let 
at = the fraction of each dollar of government investment that comes at the expense of 










the fraction of each dollar of benefits from the public project that is saved 
(invested) at time t, 
the present value of the stream of consumption, discounted at the social rate of 
time preference, that is created by one dollar of private investment at time t, 
the total dollar value of the project costs (expenditure) at time t, 
the total value of the project benefits at time t, 
the social rate of time preference, 
the period in which the last project payment or return occurs, 
loss in discounted consumption caused by the public project, and 
gain in discounted consumption accruing from the public project. 
Then, 
r 1 
L,, = Z a,) + at Vt] C, (2) ,=o(1 + i),[(1 
Gc = Y, -a , )  + ohVt] B, 
,=o(1 + i);[(1 
and Gc > Lc implies 
r 1 
Y 1 + i),([(1 - a,) + at V~]Bt [(1 - a,) + at Vt] C,) > 0 
t = 0 (  
(3) 
(4) 
The expression in brackets in Equation (2) represents the division of one dollar project 
costs into 
9 direct consumption losses caused by project funding occurring at time t, (1--at), and 
9 the present discounted value of indirect consumption losses occurring from displaced 
investment as a result of project funding at time t, atVt. 
The bracketed expression in Equation (3) represents the division of one dollar of project 
benefits into 
9 direct consumption gains resulting from project benefits occurring at time t, (1--at) 
and 
9 the present discounted value of indirect consumption gains occurring from increased 
investment as a result of project benefits at time t, at V~. 
The bracketed terms in Equations (2) and (3) are thus the adjustment factors reflecting 
the discounted consumption value to society of one dollar of public project costs and 
benefits, respectively. These terms explicitly acknowledge the fact that, in the second best 
environment assumed, the source of funds and destination of benefits will affect the 
social valuation of a public program. Specifically, since the divergence between r and i 
results in a lower amount of private savings and investment in the economy than is 
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socially optimal, government investment projects which increase net total private in- 
vestment in the economy are socially more beneficial, all else being equal, than govern- 
ment investment projects which decrease net total private investment in the economy. 
Thus, in Expression (4), the higher at is relative to at, the greater is the net increase in 
private investment that would result from the public project under consideration, and 
hence, the greater is the likelihood that Go will be larger than L~.. 
Note that, in the special case where the project is funded out of resources that 
otherwise would have been consumed and provides benefits which are consumed as they 
accrue, t~=at=0,  and Expression (4) simplifies to 
r 1 
:~ C,] > 0 (5) 
,=o(i 00, [8' 
In this case, the project simply postpones consumption to some future date, and to be 
worthwhile, must provide a rate of return which is at least as high as the rate, i, at which 
society is willing to postpone consumption now for consumption in the future. 
That the source of project funds and destination of project benefits that is, the 
distinction between displaced (replaced) investment and displaced (replaced) consump- 
tion - should affect the valuation of a public project is agreed upon by all who 
acknowledge the second-best characteristic that the class of investment projects from 
which the government may choose is (artificially) limited [7]. However, as discussed 
above, the method of accounting for source and destination is a matter of debate among 
public sector economists. Fortunately, the Bradford framework as presented in Expres- 
sion (4) is general enough to include each of the competing discounting approaches as 
special cases, and can thus be used as a vehicle for this debate. Couched in this 
framework, the debate reduces to one over the true values of various economic and 
financial parameters. 
Difference in Assumptions 
Although the validity of both the opportunity cost approach and the time preference/ 
shadow price approach depends on several important assumptions, Sjaastad and Wise- 
carver (1977) have recently shown that the controversy between the two approaches can 
be traced to different assumptions about the treatment of public capital depreciation. 
Specifically, they demonstrate that the time preference/shadow price approach (as 
represented by Marglin) assumes implicitly that society does not differentiate between 
net and gross returns on public investment projects. Thus, both depreciation and net 
benefits from the public project are subjected to the same savings/consumption decision. 
This implies, in terms of the Bradford framework, that the parameter at in Expression (4) 
must assume only one value regardless of whether benefits represent depreciation or net 
returns on the public investment project. 
The validity of the opportunity cost approach, on the other hand, rests on the 
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assumption that as the public investment project depreciates, society uses the benefits 
which represent depreciation of public capital to replace the private capital which had 
been displaced by the original funding of the public investment. In terms of the Bradford 
framework, this implies that, while the parameter at is free to assume any value for 
benefits that represent net returns to the public project, it must assume a value equal to 
the parameter a~ for project benefits which represent depreciation of public capital. 
Sjaastad and Wisecarver propose three assumptions that will ensure this result: 
9 society can and does recognize the difference between depreciation and net benefits 
from a public investment project, 
9 society attempts to save all of the benefits from the public project which represent 
depreciation, and 
9 through the interest rate effects of a properly functioning capital market, society ends 
up saving exactly that amount necessary to restore private investment to its original 
(pre-project) level, once the public investment has fully depreciated. 
The three assumptions made by Sjaastad and Wisecarver represent sufficient, but not 
necessary, conditions to ensure the savings behavior that is required for the opportunity 
cost approach to be the appropriate discounting procedure. Ultimately, the choice 
between the opportunity cost approach and the time preference/shadow price approach 
depends simply on how society treats depreciation of the public capital in question. If 
society saves in such a way as to replace the displaced private investment as the public 
capital depreciates, then the opportunity cost approach is the more appropriate dis- 
counting procedure. If society does not save in this manner, but instead subjects 
depreciation and net benefits from the public project to the same savings/consumption 
decision, then the time preference/shadow price approach is more appropriate. 
The Disaggregated Bradford Framework 
When examined within the Bradford framework, the debate between the opportunity 
cost and time preference/shadow price approaches turns out to be one over the appro- 
priate level of aggregation of project costs and benefits. Specifically, the opportunity cost 
approach argues for a level of disaggregation sufficient to allow for differential saving 
behavior (of a specific form) between benefits which represent net benefits, and those 
which represent depreciation of public capital. Fortunately, the Bradford framework is 
amenable to disaggregation of project costs and benefits, and can be expressed in a 
manner capable of handling different types of costs and benefits accruing to any number 
of different groups. 
Within this disaggregated framework, the Bradford model will reduce to the various 
opportunity cost methods (represented in the literature) under certain assumptions for 
its parameter values and to the various time preference/shadow price approaches under 
other parameter assumptions. The disaggregated framework not only incorporates the 
opportunity cost models and the time preference/shadow price models as special cases, 
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but allows explicit treatment of the more general question which Sjaastad and Wise- 
carver raise: Are there any important differences in savings behavior which the aggrega- 
tion of benefits and costs denies? 
Since the essence of Bradford's approach is to evaluate the net change in society's 
consumption stream that would result from the government project under considera- 
tion, what is required in the context of indtistry regulation is a simple representation of 
the way in which industrial regulatory activity might affect society's aggregate consump- 
tion: Thus, in order to disaggregate the Bradford framework and apply it to the costs and 
benefits of industry regulation, it is necessary to isolate those points at which a savings/ 
consumption decision must be made as a result of the regulation, and to assign parameter 
values ,(a's and a's) which characterize the decision in each case. 
Consider the following stylized characterization of the impacts of a regulatory project. 
Initially, all costs of compliance with a regulation will be born by the industry [8]. While 
for generality, the framework could allow the fraction of each dollar of initial expendi- 
ture which displaces investment to be determined exgenously, it is clear that this initial 
expenditure must comepurely at the expense of private investment. Firms in the industry 
must either initiate the project with internal funds or with funds borrowed from external 
sources. In the former case, the firm must forego its own private undertakings to comply 
with the regulatory demands [9]. In the latter case, the funds for the regulatory activity 
a r e  borrowed in private capital markets. In either case, the initial funds for the project 
come at the expense o f  private investment, and should be valued accordingly. 
Over time, theindustry will attempt to pass these costs on to the consumer and, in so 
doing, will recover part  or all of the costs incurred as a result of the regulation this will 
serve to replace the private investment displaced by the original regulatory expenditure - 
as well as a return on the initial investment, which results in a revenue allocation decision 
on the part of the firm. The recovery of these costs also results in a savings/consumption 
9 decision on the part of the consumer who must decide whether to meet these costs via 
foregone consumption or by reducing savings. Finally, consumers are also receiving the 
benefits of the regulation, which may be saved or consumed in the proportion desired. In 
order to allow for the possibility of the kind of savings behavior envisioned by Sjaastad 
and Wisecarver, benefits can be broken down into those representing net returns of the 
project and those.representing depreciation of public capital. 
With the explicit introduction into the Bradford framework of each of the major 
consumption/savings decisions that occur along the dynamic cost-pass-through process 
f rom industry to consumer, and assuming that the parameters - a's, a's, and V -  are 










c ,  = 
R d, = 
g ~, 
OL b d  : 
olb n z 
OL rn 
a rd, a rn = 
benefits of the public project that are viewed as depreciation at time t, 
benefits of the public project that are viewed as net returns at time t, 
the total dollar value of the project's costs at time t, 
industry revenue representing depreciation of the regulatory investment pro- 
ject (price impact per vehicle associated with recovery of depreciation on 
regulatory investment costs times number of vehicles affected), 
industry net revenue from the regulatory project (price impact per vehicle 
associated with the recovery of net returns on regulatory investment times 
number of vehicles affected), 
the fraction of each dollar of public project benefits viewed as depreciation 
that is saved (invested), 
the fraction of each dollar of public project benefits viewed as net returns that 
is saved (invested), 
the fraction of each dollar of revenues representing the recovery of net returns 
on investment that is saved (invested), and 
the fraction of each dollar of revenues representing the recovery of deprecia- 
tion and net returns on investment , respectively, that comes at the expense of 
private (consumer) saving. 
An additional simplifying assumption that makes Expression (6) potentially more 
useful, as it reduces the data required to make it operational, is that R'I, the net return 
from the regulatory investment captured by the industry, is approximately zero. Under 
this simplifying assumption, Expression (6) can be rewritten as 
r 1 
X i),{ B~t[(1 - a  bd) + abdv] + B~[(1 ol bn) + a bn V] - 
t=0(1 + 
[ VCt + Rt[(a rd 1) ( V- 1)]]} > 0 (7) 
where 
Rt = total industry revenues associated with the regulation (regulatory price impact 
per vehicle times number of vehicles affected). 
Once the parameters of Expression (7) are set, the data requirements will in general be 
composed of annual data on the dollar value of net and gross benefits of  the regulation, 
industry data on the total costs associated with the regulatory activity, and the total gross 
revenues that the industry can hope to recover through price increases that reflect its 
increased regulatory costs, i.e., total regulatory price impact per vehicle times number of 
vehicles affected. 
Note finally that for use in a cost effectiveness study, where the purpose is to choose the 
least-cost method among several regulatory alternatives for providing the same benefit 
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level, Expression (7) yields an expression for the present discounted value of the direct 
resource costs of a regulation, 
r 1 
L c = ~ Rt[(a r d -  1) ( V -  1)]} (8) 
t=O(1 +i)  t[VCt + 
The Shadow Price of Capital 
Until now, the shadow price of one dollar or private capital, V, has only been generally 
discussed. In the Bradford article, a derivation of V was included which assumes: 
9 that all private investment projects are of one-year duration, and 
9 that the savings/consumption decision with regard to gross returns on private in- 
vestment is made without differentiating between depreciation and net returns [10]. 
Lind (1982) has recently pointed out that these two assumptions are extremely unrealis- 
tic. He has derived an alternative approach to the calculation of Vwhich allows a private 
investment project to depreciate over N years. It assumes simply that: 
9 returns on private investment are in the form of an annuity over the N-year life of the 
investment, and 
9 all depreciation is saved, while only net returns are subjected to a savings/consump- 
tion decision. 
Lind assumes that the rate of return on private investment is r, and that the investment 
pays out uniformly over N years. Then the return in each year on one dollar of private 
investment will be 
1. 
A -  
1 -(1  +r )  N 
that is, an annuity for N years with a present value of one dollar discounted at r. Out of 
the stream of returns generated by one dollar of private investment (a stream of A dollars 
in each period), Z A  will be saved and reinvested in each period, while (1- -Z)A will be 
consumed, where Z, the fraction of A reinVested, is defined as 
D + (A - D) o~ m 
A 
where: 
D ----- depreciation, and assuming straight line depreciation, equals 1/N. 
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With A and Z defined, Lind calculates the shadow price of one dollar of private capital, 
V, as 
r I 
:~ A ( l - Z )  
t-l(1 +i) t 
V -  
T 1 
1 E A Z  
t-I(1 +i) t 
Notice that V is completely determined by four parameters, c~ rn, r, i, and N. Therefore, 
Expression (7) becomes an operational discounting procedure when values are set for a 
total of seven parameters. 
Application 
Evaluation of Assumptions 
Under the disaggregated framework presented in Expression (7), the question of which 
discounting approach is correct - time preference/shadow price or opportunity cost is 
subsumed within the question of reasonable values for the seven parameters. Though the 
task of setting values for these seven parameters appears formidable, and the 10% 
rule/c-t-c procedure by comparison may appear justified if for no other reason than by 
its simplicity, the 10% rule/c-t-c approach can be understood in this framework to imply 
its own set of parameter assumptions. In other words, as long as one accepts as valid 
9 that the government's objective in undertaking public investment projects should be 
to maximize the present value of the aggregate consumption stream (discounted at the 
social rate of time preference), 
9 that the government faces (artificial) constraints on its investment opportunities, 
9 that government investment activity does displace private investment activity, and 
9 several simplifying assumptions listed above, 
then the use of the 10% rule/c-t-c- approach (or any other discounting procedure) 
implies a set of assumptions about the seven parameters in Expression (7), and the 
validity of the procedure rests upon the validity of the parameter assumptions that are 
necessary to generate it. Thus, Expression (7) can be employed to develop and evaluate 
the conditions under which the 10% rule/c-t-c procedure (or any other procedure) is 
appropriate, given the statement of the government's constrained optimization problem. 
The 10% Rule/Cost-to-Consumer Approach 
The OMB 10% rule is generally used in concert with a cost-to-consumer notion for 
calculating the direct resource costs to society of regulatory activity in the motor vehicle 
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industry. The c-t-c approach is based on the premise that the direct resource costs of a 
regulation are best measured by the price impact of the regulation on the regulated 
vehicle [11]. The greater the impact on vehicle price, the more consumers will have to pay 
for the regulatory benefits, and hence, the greater is the cost of that regulatory program 
to society. In estimating the expected price impact on a vehicle, a simple mark-up factor 
on all variable costs of the regulation is normally used. This markup reflects industry- 
wide information on the relationship between fixed and variable costs of production, 
and is defined so that when applied to industry-wide variable costs, the resulting price 
covers all fixed costs in the industry and provides a normal return on investment [12]. 
Once the expected (real) price impact on an individual vehicle is determined, the total 
direct resource cost of the regulation is calculated by multiplying the cost per vehicle by 
the number of vehicles affected after an adjustment is made to reflect the change in 
quantity demanded due to the vehicle price increase. The resulting real cost (and benefit) 
streams are then discounted by various discount rates around l0 percent. 
Given the statement of the government's constrained optimization problem, the 
parameter assumptions under which the c-t-c measurements and the 10% rule actually 
reflect the true direct resource cost of the regulation to society are listed below [13]: 
9 Ol b n  ~-- Ol rn = 0 
9 Ot b d  ~ a r d  = 1 
9 r = a range centered around 10 percent 
9 i = unspecified 
9 N = unspecified [14]. 
Under these parameter assumptions, Expression (7) can be shown to reduce to the 10% 
rule/c-t-c formula, 
T 1 
Z {Bt Ct}>0 (9) 
,=o(l+r) '  
where r is chosen from a range of values centered on 10 percent. 
Since the implied parameter assumptions listed above do not include those additional 
assumptions necessary for the variable-cost markup simplification, Expression (9) can 
be thought of as an expression representing the true present discounted value of net 
benefits under the I0% rule/c-t-c assumptions. In practice, however, total costs of the 
regulation are normally approximated by a markup on variable costs leading to the 
formula actually used in the 10% rule/c-t-c procedure, 
Y I tEo(l+r),{B,= - (1 + M) C~ } > 0 (10) 
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where: 
M = the industry-wide markup factor on variable costs, and 
C~ = the total dollar value of the project's variable costs at time t. 
Note that Expression (10) is derivable from Expression (9) only if 
M =  
T 1 
z cf 
, = o ( 1 §  t 
T 1 
, : 0 ( l+ r )  t 
(ll) 
where 
C ~ :  the total dollar value of the project's fixed costs at time t. 
In practice, the markup M is calculated from industry-wide data on the relationship 
between fixed and variable costs. Therefore, Expression (1 l) implies that the ratio of the 
present value of fixed costs to the present value of variable costs for the public project 
under consideration - the right hand side of(1 l) - must be the same as the ratio of annual 
fixed costs to variable costs, on average, for the industry as a whole - the left hand side of 
(11) - in order for the simplified variable cost markup procedure to be correct within the 
present framework. 
In short, the 10% rule/c-t-c approach captures the true direct resource costs of 
regulation borne by society only if, among other things, 
9 all of the benefits of the regulation which are viewed as depreciation are saved, while 
all of the net benefits are consumed, 
9 the pass-through of regulatory costs from industry to consumer leaves aggregate 
savings and investment unaffected, and 
9 the structure of the present value of fixed and variable costs for the public project 
under consideration is the same as that for the industry as a whole. 
Alternative Assumptions 
With the assumptions implied by the 10% rule/c-t-c approach clearly laid out, an 
evaluation of this discounting procedure can be carried out by evaluating the validity of 
those assumptions which underlie it. Where the implied assumptions appear unreason- 
able, alternative assumptions can be made, and an alternative discounting procedure can 
be derived from the new set of parameter assumptions. This procedure provides a 
systematic way of choosing an appropriate discounting framework by reducing the 
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comparison of approaches to the evaluation of the assumptions underlying them. By 
making explicit what assumptions are being made, this approach also facilitates mean- 
ingful sensitivity analysis, since the uncertainty associated with each assumption can be 
addressed explicitly. 
Clearly the specification of reasonable values for each of the parameters in this 
framework is not a trivial matter. Both empirical evidence and simplifying rules of 
thumb would ultimately play a critical role in constructing a "best estimate" or range of 
estimates of the appropriate discounting procedure for the costs and benefits of a 
regulatory project. Still, as argued above, the additional information required to proper- 
ly employ this discounting framework is not in itself reason to reject it in favor of the 
simpler 10% rule/c-t-c approach. If the steps in developing the framework are accepted, 
then the 10% rule/c-t-c approach is simply one discounting procedure among many that 
can be generated within this framework, and its attractiveness relative to other ap- 
proaches rests on the validity of the particular parameter assumptions required to 
generate it. 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to propose appropriate values for each of the 
parameters in this framework, it would be useful nonetheless to examine the properties 
of several possible discounting procedures that are generated from reasonable values of 
the framework's parameters. Doing so will help to illustrate both the way in which the 
framework could be applied, as well as several broad differences in program treatment 
that can be expected if the 10% rule/c-t-c approach were replaced by alternative 
discounting procedures generated within this framework from reasonable parameter 
assumptions. 
In order to generate several illustrative discounting procedures within this framework, 
alternative assumptions concerning the seven parameters need to be specified. The 
parameter values assumed for the purpose of illustration are as follows. First, if vehicle 
purchasers view vehicle price increases associated with regulatory activity as subtractions 
from disposable income, then estimates of the marginal propensity to save out of 
disposable income should provide a reasonable value for the parameter a rd. For illustra- 
tion, a rd is set at 0.10. 
Second, existing empirical evidence would support values of 0.05 and 0.12 for the 
parameters i and r, respectively. While a wide range of empirical estimates for these 
parameters can be found, these values probably represent reasonable midpoint esti- 
mates. In addition, since the parameter a rn represents the fraction of net returns on 
investment that is saved, estimates of the marginal propensity tosave out of unearned 
income should provide a reasonable value estimate. For illustration, ot rn is set a 0.20. To 
specify the shadow price of capital, V, a value for the average length of time over which 
private investment projects depreciate is also required. A value of 5 years for the 
parameter N would probably represent a low estimate. 
Finally, values for the parameters a bd and a bn must be specified. If consumers are 
thought not to differentiate between gross and net benefits of the regulatory project and 
treat benefits as additions to disposable income, then setting these two parameters equal 
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to the marginal propensity to save out of disposable income would be reasonable. 
Alternatively, consumers may distinguish between gross and net benefits of the regula- 
tion, saving a portion of those benefits which represent depreciation of the regulatory 
capital, and consuming those benefits which represent net returns. If consumers are 
assumed to use regulatory benefits representing depreciation to replace the savings that 
were displaced by their original expenditure, then the parameter a bd would be set equal 
to a"d at a value of 0.10, while a t'n would be set to zero. In the first alternative discounting 
procedure, the former assumption - consumers do not differentiate - is made, while the 
second alternative assumes that consumers do in fact differentiate. 
Table 1 lists the seven parameter assumptions that generate the 10% rule/c-t-c 
approach and the two illustrative alternative approaches, as well as the assumption for 
the markup, M. Table 2 lists the necessary data for four hypothetical regulatory 
proposals. Table 3 presents the results of the application of each of the three discounting 
procedures to the four hypothetical programs. The four cost, benefit, and revenue 
streams have been chosen to illustrate several points. 
The first point concerns the consequence of estimating total costs of a regulation by a 
markup on variable costs, as is normally done in application of the 10% rule/c-t-c 
procedure. To exaggerate the point, projects 1 and 2 display identical gross benefit 
streams and identical variable cost streams, and differ fundamentally only in their fixed 
cost requirements. While it is clearly the case that project 1 is superior to project 2 by any 
reasonable criterion, the first two rows of Table 3 reveal that the 10% rule/c-t-c 
procedure fails to differentiate between these two projects, since total costs for each 
project are approximated by applying the same industry-wide markup value to (in this 
TABLEI 
Parameter Assumptions 
Parameters Discounting procedure 
10% rule/c-t-c Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
a hn 0 .0  O. 1 0 .0  
a m 0.0 0.2 0.2 
O: bd 1.0 O. 1 O. 1 
urd 1.0 O. 1 O. 1 
r 0.! 0.12 0.12 
i unspecified 0.05 0.05 
N unspecified 5 years 5 years 
M 0.4 unspecified unspecified 
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TABLE2 
H y p o t h e t i c a l P r ~ e c t D a t a  
Variable Project Period 
0 1 2 3 4 
1 120 120 120 
0 0 
2 0 0 0 
B~ 
3 
0 0 20 20 20 
4 
1 80 80 80 
0 0 
2 200 200 200 
8, 
3 
0 0 80 80 80 4 
1 
0 0 200 200 200 
2 
3 
0 0 100 lO0 100 
4 
1 100 
0 0 0 0 
2 1000 
3 
100 0 0 0 0 
4 
I 




20 40 40 40 0 
4 
1 120 
40 40 40 0 
2 1020 
3 
120 40 40 40 0 
4 
1 190 
0 0 30 20 
2 1090 
Rt 
3 120 40 40 40 0 
4 0 0 0 0 240 
TABLE 3 
Gc - -L  c 
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Project Discount ing procedure 
10% rule/c-t-c Alternat ive I Alternat ive 2 
l 284.9 338.3 244.9 
2 284.9 - 1057.6 - 1057.6 
3 58.8 39.6 24.0 
4 58.8 45.4 61.0 
case) identical variable cost streams. Alternative procedures 2 and 3, however, make use 
of total project cost data, and judge project 1 to be superior to project 2. 
In fact; as the projects have been constructed, the 10% rule/c-t-c approach would, 
assuming no budget constraint, lead to the initiation of both projects, while both 
alternative procedures would reject project 2. The general point to be made is that, by 
ignoring fixed cost data and employing instead the same industry-wide markup to 
estimate the total costs of each project, the 10% rule/c-t-c approach has a built-in bias 
toward accepting projects that are relatively capital (fixed cost) intensive, and rejecting 
projects that are relatively intensive in variable inputs. 
The second point concerns the importance of accounting for the pass-through of 
regulatory costs from industry to consumer. To exaggerate this point, projects 3 and 4 
are identical except for the timing of revenues generated by the regulatory investment. 
Project 3 entails costs which are passed on to consumers immediately, while the costs 
associated with project 4 are not passed on until some time after they occur. 
As can be seen from the last two rows of Table 3, the 10% rule/c-t-c approach does not 
differentiate between these two programs. However, both the alternative discounting 
procedures penalize the program than involves long delays between industry expendi- 
ture and the recovery of those outlays, since private investment is being postponed for a 
longer period of time. As constructed, the 10% rule/c-t-c procedure leads to acceptance 
of both projects, while the two alternative procedures accept only project 3. 
The general point here is that, unlike the alternative discounting procedures, the 10% 
rule/c-t-c procedure is not sensitive to differences in the timing of the cost pass-through 
process. Moreover, this property will be common to all discounting procedures gener- 
ated within the framework, as long as ard< 1. Thus, this point will be robust to reasonable 
sensitivity analysis. 
These two points illustrate broad differences in program treatment that could be 
expected if the 10% rule/c-t-c procedure were to be replaced by a discounting procedure 
generated within this framework which 
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9 abandons the variable cost markup approximation for total regulatory costs, and 
9 allows consumers to consume a portion of the regulatory benefits representing 
depreciation. 
However, more specific consequences of the implementation of this framework can not 
be outlined without more specific information on the actual parameter assumptions to 
be employed. Of special concern here is the shadow price of capital, V, which Lind (1982) 
has shown to be quite sensitive to specification of the parameters from which it is 
determined. 
Thus, of central importance for the implementation of this framework are consensus 
estimates for the seven parameters, in addition to confidence intervals which reflect the 
uncertainty associated with each parameter value. Consensus estimates can be employed 
to develop a preferred discounting procedure for the costs and benefits of a regulatory 
proposal, while confidence intervals will serve to delineate a range of alternatives to be 
employed in sensitivity analysis. Given this information, a meaningful and systematic 
analysis of the costs and benefits of industry regulation can be undertaken. 
Conclusions 
A methodology has been developed to facilitate the systematic comparison of alternative 
discounting procedures for the costs and benefits of industrial regulatory activity. Within 
this framework, the cloice between discounting procedures is reduced to a choice 
between assumptions about various economic and financial parameter values. 
The framework has been employed to evaluate the parameter assumptions implied by 
the discounting approach currently used by regulatory agencies in their impact analyses 
for regulation in the motor vehicle industry. This application illustrates the way in which 
the framework could be employed both to evaluate current discounting procedures and 
to develop alternative discounting approaches which reflect explicitly both underlying 
assumptions and the uncertainty associated with those assumptions. 
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Notes 
I In order to avoid issues involving project risk, it is assumed that all public and private investments are 
riskless. 
2 For simplicity, it is assumed throughout  the article that ne i the r the f i rmnor the  government faces a budget 
constraint. 
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3 An extension of this line of reasoning leads easily to the conclusion that the proportion of project benefits 
reinvested will also affect the relative valuation of a public project, and hence provides another motivation 
for the inclusion of both i and r in the discounting framework for public projects. 
4 To the extent that international capital flows make the domestic supply of capital perfectly elastic, 
government investment funds will not displace private domestic investment, and the dollar value of the 
costs and benefits of such projects could be discounted at the social rate of time preference. It is assumed 
throughout this paper that rationing in the domestic capital market does in fact occur. Such an assumption 
underlies the public sector discounting literature upon which this paper is based. 
5 It should be emphasized that government regulation of private industry, which is the focus of this paper, is 
nol a private sector undertaking. The relevant distinction between private- and public-sector undertakings 
is in what sector the decision is made undertake the project, not in what sector the project is undertaken. 
Thus, regulatory projects undertaken by private industry are public projects carried out by the private 
sector. 
6 Strictly speaking, equity and efficiency goals can be pursued independently of one another only in a 
first-best environment see, for example, Tresch (1981). 
7 As discussed previously, when no (artificial) limitations on public investment are assumed, only the rate of 
return on private investment is relevant, since this rate of return is now the oppurtunity cost of all public 
investment funds. See, for example, Mishan (1976). 
8 Regulatory costs incurred by the government are excluded from this analysis for simplicity. 
9 It is assumed for simplicity that the projects foregone by the industry have the same characteristics as 
investment projects, on average, in the economy as a whole, e.g., same average length. 
10 These assumptions allow Bradford to conclude that the shadow price of capital, V, is fairly close to one, and 
consequently that discounting unadjusted costs and benefits of government investment projects at the 
social rate of time preference represents a reasonable rule of thumb. However, with the likelihood that Vis 
significantly greater than one as Lind argues, the rule of thumb suggested by Bradford becomes less 
attractive. 
I 1 Other related costs, such as those due to decreased engine efficiency, are also counted but, for simplicity, 
they will be ignored here. 
12 An additional markup from wholesale to retail is also employed to cover dealer overhead. 
13 Note that these assumptions generate the Sjaastad and Wisecarver result that the discount rate is a weighted 
average of the social rate of time preference and the opportunity cost of capital. In this particular case, the 
weight on the opportunity cost of capital is unity, while the weight on the social rate of time preference is 
zero. An alternative, but trivial, way to generate the 10% rule/c-t-c procedure from this framework is to 
assume that i=r=0.10 so that the shadow price of capital, V, is one. 
14 For N greater than one, this set of assumptions will generate a discounting procedure identical to 
Expression (9) with the exception of one insignificant adjustment which is developed in Sjaastad and 
Wisecarver. 
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